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SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 25th MEETING

Chairman:	Mr. SAMANA (Vice-Chairman)	(Papua New Guinea)
later:	Mr. HUDYMA (Chairman)	(Ukraine)

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In the absence of Mr. Hudyma (Ukraine), Mr. Samana (Papua New Guinea), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.

The meeting was called to order at 3.20 p.m.

AGENDA ITEM 79: COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF THE WHOLE QUESTION OF PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS IN ALL THEIR ASPECTS (continued) (A/48/403-S/26450, A/49/114-S/1994/357, A/49/136, A/49/228-S/1994/827, A/49/287-S/1994/894 and Corr.1, A/49/335, 336 and 479; A/C.4/49/L.12)

1. Mr. LAVROV (Russian Federation) said that the development of international relations demonstrated that the end of the cold war did not necessarily imply a breakthrough to a problem-free "rosy period" when threats to security would just fade away. The increasing number of hotbeds of war in the world had caused many countries to turn to the United Nations as a capable means of setting up an operational and effective system of collective security. A key element of that system was peace-keeping operations, which would undoubtedly continue to be the most efficient and the highest-priority type of peacemaking activities of the United Nations. The situations which made it imperative to carry out peace-keeping operations were each unique; that was why, as the Secretary-General had noted (A/48/403-S/26450), there was as yet no fully developed permanent system of peace-keeping, only an ongoing series of ad hoc operations.

2. In his delegation's view, there was a need to work out practical criteria for carrying out such activities. The Security Council should begin a peace-keeping operation only after assessing to what extent the new situation threatened international or regional security; it should recognize that peace-keeping operations could not substitute for a political settlement, the main responsibility for which should be borne by the conflicting parties; and it should prescribe a definite mandate, laying out clear-cut goals and means to achieve them.

3. In order to broaden the scope of ongoing operations, it was necessary to improve the structures of the Secretariat which dealt with the command and control of those operations. The Russian Federation welcomed the reorganization of the Department of Peace-keeping Operations, the creation of the Situation Centre, and the working out of uniform training programmes for peace-keeping personnel as well as a whole set of contingency rules and regulations for military and civil contingents.

4. Those units should be staffed by experts from various States. Russia stood ready to dispatch additional military experts for that purpose. Russian officers could also be used more extensively to hold command positions, particularly in those operations where significant Russian military contingents were involved.

5. In the search for structures which could take on the responsibility of planning and operational control of those activities, it would be appropriate to look at the Military Staff Committee, whose function, according to the Charter, was "to advise and assist the Security Council on all questions relating to the Security Council's military requirements".

6. His delegation welcomed the decision to improve the mechanism of consultations with troop-contributing countries on peace-keeping issues and the initiative to establish national stand-by forces, and stood ready to make Russian military contingents available for such operations. As a first step, two motorized infantry divisions of the Armed Forces had been assigned for peacemaking tasks, and their training was being adjusted accordingly. The work of coordinating such units within the multinational peace-keeping forces had been started during the joint Russian-American exercise in September 1994.

7. There were many instances where regional organizations, coalitions of States and even individual States had taken the initiative of undertaking peace-keeping operations which had promoted the settlement of conflicts. The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was conducting operations of that nature, the legal basis for which was the Agreement on Military Observer Groups and Collective Peace-keeping Forces in the CIS, concluded by the CIS heads of State in Kiev on 20 March 1992. The Council of the CIS heads of State had established peace-keeping operations in the area of the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict and in Tajikistan on the basis of Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter, and on 21 October 1994 had confirmed the mandate to conduct those operations, which naturally excluded the application of enforcement measures.

8. Although Russian peace-keepers currently constituted the core of the CIS peace-keeping forces, that situation did not stem from any vested interest. Russia's efforts were aimed at putting an end to armed clashes, at stabilizing the situation and creating the conditions for a long-term and durable settlement. The extremely difficult economic situation of other CIS member States did not allow them to provide their own contingents. Russia would have preferred classical United Nations peace-keeping operations in the CIS hotbeds of conflict, and had tried, together with the Government of Georgia and with the agreement of the Abkhazian side, to implement just such an operation for many months, but without success.

9. Nevertheless, a firm truce had already been established in Moldova, the peace process was moving ahead in Georgia, and Russia had put forward initiatives to reach a settlement in Nagorny Karabakh. Conflicts in a number of the Commonwealth countries threatened not only regional but also world security; Russia was interested in the cooperation of the world community in order to solve those problems with the broadest possible involvement of the United Nations and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in peace-making activities in the CIS.

10. Considering the interests of all States in securing lasting peace on the planet, Russia stood for the fair distribution of the burden of moral, political and financial responsibilities with regard to peace-making efforts. In the light of the current geopolitical changes, it was time to take a fresh look at the existing scale of assessment for peace-keeping operations. Furthermore, United Nations expenditure on peace-keeping operations could be reduced by increasing the utilization of funds of the interested States and of regional organizations as well as through services provided free, or on a preferential basis, for the material and logistical support of operations, as well as by setting up volunteer funds both to conduct peace-keeping operations and to eliminate the consequences of the conflicts. Russia unequivocally supported

expeditious implementation of the principles approved by the Security Council with regard to establishing such funds for Abkhazia and Tajikistan.

11. Russia supported all appropriate measures aimed at improving the efficiency of peace-keeping operations and at ensuring security for United Nations personnel involved in them. It hoped that draft resolution A/C.4/49/L.12 would be adopted by consensus.

12. Mr. Hudyma (Ukraine) took the Chair.

13. Mr. JESSEN-PETERSEN (Director, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) observed that the past few years had witnessed intensified internal conflict, particularly of an ethnic nature, causing massive population displacement. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was currently assisting more than 23 million refugees and displaced persons. As it entered situations of conflict, it found itself moving closer to the peace-keeping operations of the United Nations, and those links required closer cooperation so as to maintain the humanitarian character of UNHCR activities even in integrated and multifaceted operations.

14. Humanitarian activities could not be fully effective unless related to a comprehensive strategy for peace and security, human rights and economic and social development, but it should be understood that the humanitarian agencies must maintain a degree of independence from United Nations-authorized political or military activities.

15. There were two distinct categories of multifaceted United Nations operations: (a) those where UNHCR was part of an overall peace-settlement operation, and (b) those where UNHCR worked alongside a peace-keeping operation in situations of conflict and where enforcement action might be authorized.

16. The former operations were humanitarian-military operations where humanitarian objectives had been defined and agreed upon within an overall political settlement. Cambodia and Mozambique were good examples of such operations. The peaceful settlements allowed for the return of hundreds of thousands of refugees. Conversely, the return of the refugees in safety and dignity helped to build confidence and consolidate the peace settlement.

17. It became more difficult when moving into conflict situations where enforcement action was combined with humanitarian action. Examples were Bosnia and Herzegovina, Somalia and Rwanda. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, although Security Council resolutions 770 (1992) and 776 (1992) authorized the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to protect humanitarian activities, force had never been used to obtain access. UNHCR had spent considerable time and effort negotiating access, with military escorts adding a deterrent value. The use of force against one party inevitably affected the perceived impartiality and neutrality of the United Nations and, by implication, also of United Nations humanitarian organizations associated with the operation. In those circumstances, humanitarian organizations might have to distance themselves from peace-keeping operations.

18. The more humanitarian action became part of a multifaceted United Nations peacemaking and peace-building operation, the more important it was to have a clear mandate, structures and roles for the operation. It was essential that the respective mandates should be respected by all actors involved in each operation. Humanitarian organizations must enjoy autonomy in accordance with their mandates, and must remain non-political, neutral and impartial. They should not be subordinated to military objectives, nor should conditionality be introduced in the way humanitarian action was performed. When political objectives were unclear and peace-keeping efforts turned into enforcement action, tensions arose between the political, military and humanitarian components.

19. The interaction and mutual benefit of closer cooperation between peace-keeping and humanitarian action would grow in the coming years. To that end, discussions were under way on a set of principles and practical guidelines for the protection of humanitarian mandates in conflict situations. Furthermore, UNHCR was developing - literally as it went along - handbooks and guidelines for military personnel engaged in or training for humanitarian operations.

20. Mr. MAPHORISA (Botswana) said that his country was currently participating in the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ). Botswana hoped that, in that sister country, following the recent holding of democratic elections - the freest and fairest in the history of southern Africa - peace would reign under a multi-party democratic government.

21. All aspects of peace-keeping operations must be unfailingly sensitive to the principles and purposes of the Charter. National sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference in internal affairs must be respected. Moreover, peace-keeping operations must be mandated with the consent of the parties concerned and at the request of the receiving party. The Secretary-General's Agenda for Peace had contributed a great deal to an appreciation of the complications that bedeviled peace-keeping. No one could minimize the potentials inherent in the concept of preventive diplomacy. Prevention was better than cure. However, preventive diplomacy could only succeed if coupled with early-warning mechanisms. To be effective, those mechanisms would have to be decentralized. Regional arrangements should therefore be strengthened to enable rapid response to the outbreak of conflict in the region concerned.

22. In southern Africa, the front-line States had been a subregional group which for 20 years had brokered peace in unliberated areas of the subregion. Such efforts could serve as an example to the international community at United Nations level. Botswana supported the idea of a stand-by force for rapid response to the outbreak of a conflict. The very existence of such a force might be a powerful deterrent.

23. The need for disarmament must be addressed more seriously. There was an inflation of all types of weapons all over the world, causing death and misery to millions of innocent people. Trafficking and trade in arms must be discouraged and stopped. Arms-manufacturing States must exercise greater responsibility. Botswana paid tribute to the members of those contingents of peace-keeping operations who had paid the ultimate price in the service of international peace.

24. Mr. AL-OTAIBI (Kuwait) said that he had listened with great interest, at the opening of the general discussion on item 79, to the statement by the Under-Secretary-General for Peace-keeping Operations, and paid tribute to the staff of the Secretariat, especially of the Department of Peace-keeping Operations, for their efforts in support of those operations.

25. Currently, peace-keeping operations were not confined to supervising the cease-fire in a conflict. They also covered more extensive and complex tasks, including the holding of elections, the safeguarding of human rights and the establishment of government institutions. That was an outcome of the far-reaching changes that had occurred in international relations following the cold war. That situation had also overburdened the Organization, whose responsibilities had now increased. Peace-keeping operations faced administrative and financial problems that called for immediate solutions.

26. To solve those problems, there was a need, first, for the political will and conviction to apply the concept of collective security, as had clearly occurred in the Gulf War, in which Kuwait had been liberated. If the same political will had prevailed in the case of the former Yugoslavia, the Serbs would not have been able to invade Bosnia and Herzegovina or to flout the resolutions of international bodies.

27. Second, it was necessary to identify clearly the objectives of peace-keeping operations. Third, there was a need to create a mechanism or organ comprising the Secretariat, the Security Council, the troop-contributing countries and the countries affected or directly concerned in a conflict. The work of that mechanism would consist in planning all peace-keeping operations and related measures. It would also conduct consultations and coordinate activities in connection with the administration of those operations. In that regard, Kuwait welcomed the statement by the President of the Security Council on 4 November 1994 as a positive step.

28. Fourth, all States must undertake to pay their contributions in full and on time. Under the Charter, the financing of peace-keeping operations was the collective responsibility of all Member States.

29. The United Nations had played an important role in Kuwait, with the aim of achieving peace and stability in the region. Kuwait had supported the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM), and had maintained cooperation and coordination with its leaders. In November 1993, Kuwait had decided to pay two thirds of the costs of that operation, demonstrating its desire that the operation should be successful. Kuwait paid tribute to the way in which UNIKOM monitored violations by Iraq along the frontier and thanked all those countries which had contributed contingents to the Mission.

30. Iraq's recent recognition of the sovereignty and independence of Kuwait was a step forward which should be followed by other such steps, so as to strengthen the security of the country and the region. In that way it would be possible to restore trust and credibility in the Iraqi regime.

31. The failure of one peace-keeping operation or the non-completion of its objectives was due to the late deployment of troops. Learning from the past,

Kuwait supported the Netherlands' proposal to establish a military contingent as a permanent stand-by force at the Security Council's disposal for any emergency calling for rapid deployment to any hot spot in the world. Nevertheless, preventive diplomacy undoubtedly remained the best means of confronting conflict situations.

32. Kuwait welcomed the decision recently adopted by consensus in the Sixth Committee concerning a draft international convention dealing with the safety and security of United Nations and associated personnel.

33. Mr. FLORES OLEA (Mexico) welcomed the conclusion of negotiations on draft resolution A/C.4/49/L.12. During the current year, the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations had limited its deliberations to fewer topics, and had thus been able to concentrate on areas requiring greatest attention. The Committee was important because it provided a forum in which States that were interested in peace-keeping operations, even though they were not members of the Security Council, could express their ideas and concerns on peace-keeping and international security. It constituted an essential link between the Secretariat and the General Assembly. The extent to which the Security Council took the Special Committee's recommendations into account in formulating its policies would determine the degree of acceptance and legitimacy of peace-keeping operations.

34. Peace-keeping operations could never be a substitute for the negotiated resolution of conflicts. When deployed, they should be preceded and accompanied by all possible methods for the peaceful settlement of disputes in conformity with the Charter. Peace-keeping operations could never be isolated or separated from previous efforts at negotiation. In order for it to last the parties involved must want peace. The international community could not substitute for the parties to a conflict; its role was to provide support and cooperation.

35. Mexico was convinced that the Security Council should authorize the use of force under Chapter VII of the Charter, only as a last resort, and only after all possibilities for peaceful resolution had been exhausted. Strictly speaking, Chapter VII of the Charter (on which the Security Council was relying increasingly) called for punitive actions only against those who violated the international legal order. The Security Council's increasingly frequent authorizations of the use of force under Chapter VII had taken place in a legal framework that had not always been well defined, and had been based on excessively broad interpretations of the powers granted under the Charter. When applying Chapter VII it was essential to stick to the original interpretation and intent that the founders of the United Nations had specifically had in mind.

36. Mexico had insisted that the Special Committee should recommend that allocation of additional resources to peace-keeping operations should not adversely affect the resources intended for cooperation in international development. While recognizing the importance of the numerous peace-keeping operations that had been authorized in recent times, Mexico and other developing countries were concerned that international cooperation activities would lose out in the allocation of resources.

37. Mexico had urged that, as a general rule, once the mandate for a peace-keeping operation ended, when an extension was judged appropriate, the parties involved should take on substantial financial responsibility for it, as was already occurring in several cases. The object was to promote conflict resolution and prevent peace-keeping operations from becoming an excessive financial burden for States.

38. Mexico had accepted the compromise formula contained in paragraph 59 of the report of the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations (A/49/136), reproduced in paragraph 20 of draft resolution A/C.4/49/L.12. The recommendation was a significant step that would contribute not only to improving the financial planning of peace-keeping operations, but also to putting new life into operations that had been in existence for a long time and that had become bogged down as a result.

39. The financial aspect of peace-keeping operations was once again the focus of debate. It was not merely a cash flow problem, it was a question of adopting a realistic policy to ensure that such operations were planned with an awareness of priorities and efficiency. Funding was the engine and the limiting factor of such operations. The increase in the number of operations had not resulted in a more peaceful world, but had pointed up the need to apply more selective criteria, with realistic mandates, so as not to waste resources. Mexico would continue to contribute to such deliberations in the Fifth Committee.

40. Mexico had shown its support, in various forums, for modernizing and stimulating the mechanisms of coordination between the General Assembly and the Security Council so that each could carry out its responsibilities more effectively. In that context, Mexico welcomed the statement made by the President of the Security Council on 4 November 1994 calling for the institutionalization of the mechanism of consultation between members of the Security Council and troop-contributing countries, on the basis of a well-conceived proposal by Argentina and New Zealand.

41. The importance of having a legal instrument guaranteeing the security of peace-keeping operations personnel had become apparent. The working group charged with formulating a convention on that sensitive topic had recently completed its work. The draft convention recently adopted by the Sixth Committee had been made possible thanks to the flexibility and spirit of cooperation demonstrated by many delegations. Mexico hoped that no serious problems would arise in the future over the interpretation and practical application of the Convention.

42. The fact that peace-keeping operations had not been provided for in the Charter did not prevent their being undertaken in accordance with principles, regarding, inter alia, respect for the sovereignty and internal authority of States, that had won widespread acceptance among Member States. The principles on which peace-keeping operations were based were becoming increasingly diffuse. Mexico considered it especially important to arrive at a series of principles and guidelines, as recommended by the Special Committee in paragraph 49 of its report and reproduced in paragraph 7 of the draft resolution. That work should be the responsibility of the Special Committee, because of its experience in handling questions concerning peace-keeping operations.

43. Those operations had become one of the most visible symbols of the United Nations. It was somewhat paradoxical that an organization founded to build peace should be identified with military activity. That situation was a reminder that efforts should be aimed at settling the fundamental causes of conflict and not be limited to resolving their most immediate critical manifestations.

44. Mr. SEGHIB (Algeria) said that the spectacular growth in peace-keeping operations pointed up the need to strengthen the capacities of the United Nations in that area. The concept of peace-keeping itself had changed. In that regard, the Special Committee should bring its experience to bear on the process of developing a conceptual framework for current and future operations.

45. In many cases that increased volume and complexity had not come about as a result of a debate or explicit consensus regarding the role that the United Nations and other bodies should play, nor regarding the political and practical limits of the endeavour. The fact was that the needs in respect of peace-keeping exceeded the current capacities of the Organization in many areas, and Algeria therefore considered it appropriate to agree beforehand on the conditions of deployment and to define more precisely the reasonable limits of the United Nations' participation. He stressed that all aspects of peace-keeping operations must strictly respect the purposes and principles of the Charter, particularly those regarding national sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-intervention in the internal affairs of States.

46. There was no doubt that the end of the cold war had brought about a change in international relations and that, as a result, the United Nations needed to adapt to current conditions. At the same time, all countries must adjust their own policies so as not to lose sight of the fact that the activities of the United Nations must be governed by the principles of the Charter.

47. Since one of the United Nations' most important tasks was to preserve international peace and security, in order to do so efficiently, impartially and justly in accordance with the principles of international law, it was essential to undertake reform through the multilateral cooperation of all States on an equal basis. The General Assembly was the right setting for such activities.

48. With regard to the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) and the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II), he drew attention to some inadmissible tendencies in international relations that had appeared particularly in the process of resolving the conflicts in the Balkans and the Horn of Africa.

49. Although a broad consensus had been achieved in the Security Council in those two cases, and the Council's decisions on the topic had been adopted unanimously (signalling a step forward and a strengthening of the role of the Security Council), Algeria as well as many other countries felt that that was laudable only if it was not the result of high-handedness on the part of some permanent members of the Security Council, and if it did not simply mean that other members, aware of their inability to exercise a decisive influence, had tacitly accepted (or at least not openly disapproved of) those decisions.

Consequently, without diminishing the importance of the Security Council or the need to establish a lasting peace, the best setting was the General Assembly; its role as principal organ of the United Nations needed to be considerably strengthened.

50. On the other hand, the various reports of the Secretary-General underlined the importance attached to regional organizations; the latter were useful in helping the United Nations resolve some conflicts. In that context, and in light of the tragedy in Rwanda, it was necessary to stress that the Africans themselves should participate more directly in the resolution of their security problems; the Organization of African Unity (OAU) could play an important role in that regard. Time, effort and sacrifice would certainly be needed in order for such a policy to bear fruit; accordingly, the United Nations should help OAU to continue its activities of preventive diplomacy in order to transform them into a real mechanism of collective security that would later ease the tremendous burden borne by the United Nations in that sphere.

51. With regard to the financing of peace-keeping operations, Member States should pay their assessed contributions in full, and the expenses connected with peace-keeping operations should be construed as set forth in Article 17 of the Charter. The current method of apportioning assessment should be maintained, and the relevant bodies should move quickly to institutionalize them. In addition, account should be taken of the special responsibilities of the permanent members of the Security Council and of the developing countries' capacity to pay.

52. Algeria felt that it was time to conclude agreements that would allow peace-keeping training to be provided to troop-contributing countries. It would also be necessary to establish guidelines for the training of, among others, civilian specialized units responsible for supervising elections. Similarly, it would be advisable to put into practice the idea concerning the fellowship programme referred to in paragraph 30 of resolution 47/71.

53. Algeria welcomed the recent reforms undertaken to strengthen the capacities of the Secretariat in the areas of planning, logistics, command and control of peace-keeping operations, and reiterated that it would continue to participate actively in the review and formulation of proposals on behalf of Member States, in consultation with the Secretary-General, regarding practical means for improving the efficiency of peace-keeping operations.

54. Mr. SHAMBOS (Cyprus) said that, in view of the profound political and socio-economic transformations and new challenges to peace and security the world over, peace-keeping operations had acquired new dimensions. Cyprus welcomed recent initiatives undertaken to improve peace-keeping operations by, among other things, increasing consultations and coordination mechanisms between troop-contributing countries, members of the Security Council and the Secretariat. Draft resolution A/C.4/49/L.12 set out various important aspects of peace-keeping, including financial and organizational matters. Cyprus also welcomed the organizational approach of the Secretary-General as contained in the document entitled "Improving the Capacity of the United Nations for Peace-keeping" (A/48/403-S/26450).

55. Regarding the financing of peace-keeping operations, the modest resources available to the United Nations were insufficient to support the ever-rising demand for such operations. He hoped that the proposals set forth in that regard would contribute towards the amelioration of the financial situation of the United Nations.

56. Another issue of major concern was the security of United Nations peace-keeping personnel. Cyprus would welcome measures in that regard. He recalled the casualties suffered by peace-keepers in Cyprus in 1974.

57. Cyprus, a victim of military occupation and aggression, had benefited from United Nations peace-keeping operations through the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). Although its presence had not prevented the military invasion and occupation of nearly 40 per cent of the Republic's territory in 1974, its vital role and its praiseworthy humanitarian work had never been questioned. Had UNFICYP been withdrawn, it would have given rise to conflict with grave consequences for Cyprus and the region as a whole.

58. The occupation troops, instead of withdrawing as they had been called upon to do by repeated General Assembly and Security Council resolutions, had been strengthened to alarming proportions, making the continued presence of UNFICYP in Cyprus indispensable. The victim of aggression must not be punished for the lack of action on the part of the Security Council to enforce its resolutions or the lack of political will on the part of the aggressor to reach an agreement in accordance with General Assembly and Security Council resolutions. Cyprus had increased its voluntary contribution to $18.5 million, over and above its obligations under article 19 of the Status of Forces Agreement, thus covering a substantial part of the cost of maintaining UNFICYP.

59. The example of Cyprus proved that peace-keeping must be followed by peacemaking and peace-building operations via the immediate implementation of relevant Security Council resolutions. The ultimate goal was to ensure international legal order and to secure freedom, justice and social progress in the world. In brief, it was necessary to enable the United Nations to maintain international peace and security, including by means of peace-enforcement if necessary.

60. That was as pertinent to Cyprus as it was to every other peace-keeping operation in the world, for, in the final analysis, the success of a peace-keeping operation had to be judged by the net result of the whole process, of which peace-keeping was but one component. Only a world organization capable of using the powers conferred upon it by its founding members could secure international peace and security for all nations.

61. A just, lasting and peaceful solution of the problem of Cyprus would benefit not only its people, but would also serve peace in the eastern Mediterranean.

62. Mr. SARDENBERG (Brazil) said that although several of the peace-keeping operations recently undertaken by the United Nations, such as UNPROFOR, UNOSOM II and ONUMOZ, were large-scale ones, they could not be taken as a yardstick, as peace-keeping operations should respond to the specific

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requirements of each case. The report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization (A/49/1) drew attention to the range of difficulties encountered by the so-called second generation operations.

63. Although the deployment of multinational forces recently authorized by the Security Council might be unavoidable in certain situations, the presence of multiple actors in the same area could lead to misperception of the role played by the United Nations. As the Secretary-General had himself observed, it was essential to avoid the revival of zones of influence legitimized by the Organization.

64. Brazil had repeatedly reaffirmed that a peace-keeping operation was, or should be, an impartial, multilateral, mediatory presence intervening in a dispute with the consent of all the parties to it and at their request. It could be aptly described as an instrument to assist relevant peacemaking efforts in the field and never as an end in itself. Another important aspect was the need to clarify the relationship between peace-keeping operations and humanitarian assistance. Although both components should be coordinated, it was important not to lose sight of the fact that their mandates and objectives were different.

65. He welcomed the adoption of the statement by the President of the Security Council (S/PRST/1994/62) which set out the Security Council decision to establish procedures for regular and more frequent consultations between its members, troop-contributing countries and the Secretariat. He also noted that one such meeting had recently taken place on the final extension of the mandate of ONUMOZ, and trusted that the procedure for such meetings would be continually improved as required. Brazil was prepared to cooperate in that endeavour within the relevant United Nations bodies.

66. While the number of countries contributing to peace-keeping operations had increased considerably, the size and composition of the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations had remained unchanged for many years and did not reflect the composition of troop-contributing countries as a whole. Accordingly, while Brazil commended the openness and flexibility that prevailed in the deliberations of the Special Committee, it believed that there was a need for Member States to review its composition, and that the Special Committee should include on the agenda of its 1995 session an item relating to its composition and methods of work.

67. He then referred to the Organization's financial difficulties, and in particular those connected with peace-keeping operations. He reviewed the successive resolutions adopted by the General Assembly to apportion contributions due from Member States to finance peace-keeping operations, and said that the principles set out in resolution 3101 (XXVIII) of 1973 remained valid and that peace-keeping operations were a collective but differentiated responsibility of Member States, in which special responsibilities were incumbent upon the permanent members of the Security Council. Brazil firmly believed that the best way of providing a sound and durable solution to the Organization's financial situation was by observing the principle of equitable taxation with equitable representation, and was prepared to cooperate in that endeavour.

68. Mr. RAHMAN (Pakistan) said that he wished to place on record Pakistan's appreciation for the distinguished leadership of the Secretary-General in commanding peace-keeping operations. Pakistan fully subscribed to the views expressed in the report of the Secretary-General on improving the capacity of the United Nations for peace-keeping (A/48/403).

69. His delegation deeply appreciated the efforts of the Government of Canada in hosting a high-level meeting in Ottawa in April 1994 and was confident that the three working documents prepared at that meeting would make a significant contribution to the debate on peace-keeping.

70. Pakistan welcomed the statement by the President of the Security Council on the establishment of more effective consultations between the members of the Council and troop-contributing countries, which was an important first step, and thanked Argentina and New Zealand for their initiative on that issue. It was important to improve consultative machinery, not only because troop-contributing countries needed to be informed of important developments pertaining to peace-keeping operations in which their troops were involved, but also because they should be consulted about decisions with a bearing on their contingents; in the light of Article 44 of the Charter of the United Nations, that issue was fundamental.

71. Pakistan had benefited directly from United Nations peace-keeping operations and believed that they played a vital role in the maintenance of peace and security. For that reason, he thanked all the troop-contributing countries which had provided contingents for the United Nations Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), and particularly its personnel, for their commitment to their mandate, despite the adverse conditions under which they were operating.

72. The importance that Pakistan attached to United Nations peace-keeping operations was apparent from the scale of its involvement in them; Pakistan was currently contributing over 10,000 personnel to eight peace-keeping operations. In addition, Pakistan had promised to contribute personnel to the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) and to the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM).

73. His delegation attached great importance to crisis prevention and preventive diplomacy. The United Nations should act before the outbreak of a conflict rather than intervening once the conflict had already erupted. Machinery must be developed to provide an early warning of impending crises. That would considerably enhance the effectiveness of peace-keeping operations and dramatically reduce their cost. Moreover, more efforts should be made to seek political solutions to conflicts by resorting more frequently to Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations. Although the appointment of Special Representatives of the Secretary-General was a useful means of solving specific conflicts, the results so far achieved were not encouraging. His delegation was gratified that the draft resolution before the Committee stressed the utilization of all possible means, including the need to find political means of peacefully settling disputes.

74. In order to ensure the effectiveness of peace-keeping operations, it was essential that there should be no alteration in their mandate without the express approval of the Security Council. The Council should maintain control over operations at all stages. Lastly, there was a tendency unilaterally to send military forces to areas of conflict and subsequently to seek approval from the Security Council. Such a practice could become an instrument for intervention by larger Powers in smaller countries.

75. The effective functioning of United Nations peace-keeping operations also required the provision of personnel and equipment commensurate to the assigned tasks. Pakistan thus welcomed the Secretary-General's initiative to establish stand-by arrangements for peace-keeping and was seriously considering the possibility of participating in those arrangements. It also noted with interest the Netherlands proposal to establish a United Nations brigade.

76. In order to place peace-keeping operations on a sound financial footing, all States must pay their assessed contributions in full and on time, in accordance with the existing scale of assessments. As a developing country, Pakistan was deeply concerned about the adverse effect that the deteriorating financial situation of the United Nations could have on the reimbursement of troop-contributing countries. If the present situation was allowed to continue, it might make it almost impossible for developing countries to participate in peace-keeping operations. It was important in that context to undertake effective planning, budgeting and administration of peace-keeping operations with a view to curtailing their cost and to ensure that the major Powers which provided heavy equipment and services should not seek to make a profit from such operations.

77. His delegation wished to express its particular concern with regard to the current arrangements for compensation for death or disability in the case of national contingents. Since all troops performed the same tasks and confronted similar risks, compensation by the United Nations in case of death or injury should be provided uniformly and equally.

78. It noted with interest the progress in the Sixth Committee on the text of a draft international convention on the safety and security of United Nations and associated personnel, and it urged the Secretary-General to initiate a dialogue with Member States on possible additional measures that could be taken where the current safety measures were inadequate. In conclusion, he welcomed the resolution adopted by consensus by the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations and hoped that it would be adopted unanimously by the Committee and that its provisions would be fully implemented in both letter and spirit.

79. Mr. KASANDA (Zambia) said that he associated himself with various aspects of the report submitted by the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations (A/49/136). Given the current re-emergence of ethnic, religious, cultural and other kinds of conflicts, Zambia welcomed the adoption of General Assembly resolution 48/42, which, inter alia, called for the comprehensive review of the whole question of peace-keeping operations in all their aspects.

80. The increase in peace-keeping operations in recent years and the diversity of the activities they had to perform required a closer examination of issues

such as their mandates, duration, spheres of activity and cost, as well as the security of the personnel involved. In that regard, Zambia supported the important steps taken by the Secretary-General to strengthen the Department of Peace-keeping Operations.

81. As a troop-contributing country, his Government fully supported the recent statement by the President of the Security Council on the creation of a more effective system of consultation between the members of the Council, the troop-contributing countries and the Secretariat, for those countries needed to feel that they were partners in peace-keeping operations to which they had contributed troops or civilian personnel.

82. Nevertheless, it was firmly convinced that more could be done to disseminate information on peace-keeping operations. In that regard, it called upon the Department of Public Information to make a greater effort to ensure the timely availability of information on various United Nations peace-keeping operations, so that the local populations in both the troop-contributing countries and in the territory on which the operations were taking place were kept well informed about the nature of the operations. That was essential if public support was to be generated for peace-keeping operations and their chances of success thus improved

83. The recent acts of genocide in Rwanda, aggravated by the lack of a prompt and adequate response from the international community and even the delayed deployment of troops of the United Nations Assistance Mission to Rwanda (UNAMIR), were deplorable. Several African countries had expressed their willingness to offer assistance but had been prevented from doing so for lack of logistical support. Zambia supported the idea that cooperation in peace-keeping with regional organizations should be further developed. In the case of Africa, the Organization of African Unity had established a mechanism for conflict prevention, management and resolution. Financial assistance from the international community was needed to enable that important instrument to operate effectively. Zambia welcomed the idea of establishing logistical support centres at the regional level and introducing stand-by arrangements. All those initiatives would expedite peace-keeping operations and encourage direct involvement of regional organizations and their member States in the resolution of conflicts in their regions.

84. His Government attached high priority to the promotion of standardized peace-keeping training among the troop-contributing countries and would welcome the establishment of training centres in Africa, where the need was most acute and urgent.

85. The security of United Nations peace-keepers was a matter of highest priority and serious attention should be given to it in the planning phase of peace-keeping operations, in the standardized training for such operations and during the consideration of the draft convention on the matter.

86. In order to finance peace-keeping operations, it was necessary to improve the cash flow, establish a competitive and efficient procurement process and a simplified and expeditious budgetary process, and minimize delays in reimbursements for troop and equipment costs.

87. Zambia was convinced that peace-keeping operations would not in themselves ensure international peace and security. The objective should be to recognize the root causes of the conflicts. In many cases, poverty and privation were the underlying causes and consequently development and related issues were fundamental to promoting the cause of peace from the most comprehensive perspective. Hence the significance of the Secretary-General's recent agenda for development and its symbiotic linkage to his "Agenda for Peace".

88. Lastly, his delegation looked forward to the signing of the Peace Accords between the Government of Angola and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) on 20 November 1994 in Lusaka. In that regard, it commended the initiative taken by the Mission Planning Service to prepare a detailed plan for a new United Nations mission in Angola to facilitate its rapid deployment as soon as there was a political settlement and Member States had provided the required troops and logistical resources.

89. Mr. MORENO (Cuba) said that his delegation wished to place on record its satisfaction with the positions adopted by the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries regarding peace-keeping operations. The decisions adopted by the Movement in Cairo in June 1994 could help to advance the work of the Special Committee because they defined a number of principles and approaches which could serve as a basis for the establishment and development of peace-keeping operations.

90. It should be recalled that peace-keeping processes must be governed by the same rules of operation as other United Nations activities. Hence, the principle of respect for the sovereignty, sovereign equality and territorial integrity of all States and non-interference in their internal affairs should become the leading principle of peace-keeping operations. Accordingly, the request and consent of the parties to a conflict was essential for the establishment of a peace-keeping operation in their territories, and any United Nations presence in such territories must be impartial.

91. His delegation was concerned at the fact that in recent years, the use of force and the implementation of sanctions on behalf of the Organization had proliferated, operations had been undertaken without regard for the need for the request and consent of the parties; impartiality had been abolished; and Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter, which provided that "Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State", had conveniently been forgotten.

92. There had been repeated demands for peace-keeping operations, in all their aspects, to be under the operational control of the United Nations at all times; however, that principle had been weakened time and again through the growing practice of granting a "franchise" to States or groups of States to act on behalf of the United Nations.

93. It was also alarming to note the increase in the tendency for peace-keeping operations to absorb other activities of the Organization involving humanitarian relief, electoral assistance or human rights. In the near future, if the current rate of absorption continued, the majority of United Nations activities would, in one way or another, be linked to peace-keeping operations. That would

have an adverse impact on the Organization's highly multidisciplinary nature. The transfer of the Field Operations Division and the Electoral Assistance Division to the Department of Peace-keeping Operations illustrated that phenomenon.

94. Furthermore, there was an obvious trend towards militarization of the Organization. Currently, there were even proposals for the preventive deployment of troops who would be stationed outside the zone of operations in case of emergency, and other mechanisms, such as rapid-deployment units, which would mean that the military function with which the United Nations was to be endowed would take precedence over its real political, social, humanitarian and economic development functions.

95. With regard to the negotiations for the conclusion of an international instrument to protect peace-keeping personnel, Cuba was the first to deplore the loss of human lives among such personnel, and to believe that measures must be adopted to safeguard their security. However, as Cuba had maintained on more than one occasion, the safety of peace-keeping personnel was closely linked to the application of the principles of request and consent and non-interference in internal affairs. There was no hope of guaranteeing such safety when the population of the territory in which a peace-keeping operation was deployed regarded its personnel as an army of occupation or intervention.

96. Transparency at every stage of peace-keeping operations was as necessary as the body which approved them on a regular basis, namely, the Security Council. Accordingly, while Cuba welcomed the statement made by the President of the Council on 4 November 1994 regarding consultations with troop-contributing States, it also believed that consultations were not sufficient. There were numerous additional measures which could be adopted to ensure complete transparency in such operations. For example, the mechanisms for consultation between the Council and all States concerned in the development of a peace-keeping operation should be institutionalized; to that end, special bodies could be established in which all States concerned would participate.

97. The United Nations was faced with a basic dichotomy between peace-keeping and development which, in lieu of complementing each other, had become adversaries. Not only did they compete for the limited resources of the Organization and the international community, but they also served as the backdrop for a conceptual debate in which, inevitably, those who had the economic and military strength needed to impose peace by force confronted those who called for peace through justice and social development. What was involved was not a sterile debate. The question had to do not only with determining the type of activities to which more resources would be devoted, whether peace-keeping or development, but also with defining what would be more effective in order to achieve peace: whether to impose it by military means, or to promote it by guaranteeing that all peoples had sustainable access to the progress which only a few currently enjoyed.

98. Mr. ABDERAHMAN (Egypt) said that the Fourth Committee was considering the report of the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations almost six months after its adoption by the Special Committee; during that period, there had been major developments in peace-keeping. Some progress had been achieved towards

the implementation of a number of the Committee's recommendations. One example of that was the recent statement by the President of the Security Council concerning the strengthening of the arrangements for consultations between troop-contributing countries, the Security Council and the Secretary-General.

99. On the other hand, the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) had been a disappointing failure; moreover, the United Nations was facing a genuine financial crisis in respect of peace-keeping operations, which could threaten its ability to maintain some of those operations or to establish new ones.

100. Therefore, it was necessary to assess the future of peace-keeping activities in a comprehensive manner. At its next session, the Special Committee might need to allow for a measure of consolidation in reviewing peace-keeping operations in all their aspects.

101. In the light of the massive expansion of demands for peace-keeping missions, the Special Committee could make a valuable contribution to increasing the effectiveness of the United Nations system in responding to such demands. Egypt was honoured to serve on the Bureau of the Special Committee which, under the very able leadership of its Chairman, had again been able to produce a consensus report (A/49/136).

102. The nature of peace-keeping operations had evolved rapidly and expanded beyond that of traditional military observer missions. The mechanisms and practices established by the United Nations in the field of peace-keeping had responded flexibly to the new demands of recent years.

103. While the number of peace-keepers in the field had increased substantially, the resources available to the Organization were not sufficient to enable it to respond in a timely manner to the demand for peace-keeping missions. In the light of the current financial crisis of the United Nations, paying outstanding assessed contributions and then adopting measures to strengthen the financial arrangements and controls of the operations should be the most important step.

104. All Member States should pay the cost of peace-keeping operations through assessed contributions. Under Article 17 of the Charter, the payment of assessed contributions was an unconditional international legal obligation for all Member States and not simply a commitment of a political or voluntary nature. Such contributions must be paid in full and on time in order to enable the United Nations to reimburse the costs of troop-contributing countries. Otherwise, developing countries would be constrained in their ability to contribute to peace-keeping operations which, in turn, would undermine the principle of the universality of such operations.

105. Egypt welcomed the statement by the President of the Security Council (S/PRST/1994/62) on strengthening the arrangements for consultations between troop-contributing countries, members of the Security Council and the Secretary-General. It called upon the Security Council to take further steps towards fulfilling the purposes of Article 44 of the United Nations Charter. Egypt also wished to see the consultation process expanded further to encompass interested regional parties.

106. While the Security Council bore primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, that responsibility must also be shared by the General Assembly, and must go beyond the field of financing: the General Assembly could play a more active role in various areas of peace-keeping.

107. The first peace-keeping operation had been established by the General Assembly in Sinai; as a troop-contributing country for several operations, Egypt was fully aware of the dangerous circumstances under which the personnel were required to work. Egypt had been actively participating in the work of the Sixth Committee on the protection of peace-keeping personnel and welcomed the successful outcome of the negotiations to conclude an international convention on the safety and security of United Nations and associated personnel. Egypt called upon the Secretary-General to conclude his review of current arrangements for compensation for death, injury or illness attributable to peace-keeping service.

108. Egypt welcomed the establishment of an around-the-clock Situation Centre in the Department of Peace-keeping Operations which would improve communications with United Nations operations throughout the world and assist other departments, and the United Nations Security Coordinator, in discharging their responsibilities in the field.

109. With regard to training, his delegation commended the efforts of the Department of Peace-keeping Operations to promote standardized peace-keeping training, and also the work of the Training Unit. His Government had decided to establish, in Cairo, a Training Centre for Conflict Resolution and Peace-keeping in Africa, and was confident that it would receive assistance from the Department and from other countries with experience in that field.

110. As to the establishment of a stand-by forces planning team, Egypt had recently expressed its willingness, in principle, to participate in such arrangements.

111. In conclusion, Egypt wished to stress the important role of the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations; it believed that the Special Committee would correct the negative image of United Nations peace-keeping operations resulting from the recent setbacks in some operations, such as in Somalia, or the lack of resolve to implement the mandate of some other operations, as in Bosnia. It was to be hoped that all the peoples of the world would continue to rely on United Nations peace-keeping operations until it was possible to restore peace to troubled areas.

112. Mr. EKOUMILONG (Cameroon) said that the opportunities offered by the end of the cold war enabled the United Nations to work in harmony for the sake of economic and social development, respect for and promotion of human rights and the maintenance of international peace and security. In that new situation, peace-keeping operations and other related activities were of great importance and required considerable human, financial and material resources. Currently, the volume and complexity of peace-keeping operations had increased to the point where they related to an increasing number of areas which until recently had been considered within the exclusive domain of States. In that context, the efforts of the Secretariat to adapt to those changes were commendable. The

developing countries believed that peace-keeping operations were no more than one means, among others, of achieving the objective of peace; it was therefore necessary to act with prudence and transparency in all aspects of such operations.

113. Cameroon had reiterated on many occasions that the work of the United Nations should be directed towards conflict prevention, since that was more effective and less burdensome than peace-keeping operations. If early warning systems were established and the main causes of possible conflict such as, inter alia, poverty, intolerance of all kinds and also ignorance, were recognized in time, the United Nations could be more successful in saving the lives of millions of people. Even if the number of peace-keeping operations could be reduced, however, they would always be needed, and Cameroon therefore believed that the time had come to take stock in order to benefit from past experience. In that respect, many proposals had been made which required careful consideration.

114. On the question of the expansion of peace-keeping operations, it was essential to respect the spirit of the Charter regarding the sovereign equality of States, territorial integrity and non-intervention in internal affairs. As to the decisions regarding those operations, although the Security Council had primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, the desire of the majority of Member States for greater transparency and trust must also be taken into account.

115. Cameroon welcomed the statement by the President of the Security Council regarding the need to hold meetings between members of the Council, troop-contributing countries and the Secretariat, and also the exchange of information between the Security Council and the countries of each region concerned. In that context, Cameroon stressed the need to achieve broader participation in peace-keeping operations, which would better reflect the universality of the Organization. Cameroon welcomed the Secretariat's proposals for the establishment of stand-by arrangements and stressed the need to train peace-keeping personnel in an adequate and standardized manner.

116. Cameroon believed that it was necessary to define for each operation a clear mandate which could not be changed by any of the parties to a conflict. It believed that command should be carried out exclusively by the highest levels of the Secretariat.

117. Cameroon also wished to recall the important role played by regional mechanisms in the maintenance of international peace and security; although they did not always have the necessary resources to ensure the success of their activities, they deserved the support of the international community.

118. The financing of peace-keeping operations was the collective responsibility of all Member States, which should pay their assessed contributions in full and on time, although the members of the Security Council had greater responsibility. In that respect, Cameroon hoped that the current system of assessing contributions would be institutionalized.

119. In conclusion, Cameroon welcomed the draft international convention on the safety and security of United Nations and associated personnel recently completed by the Ad Hoc Committee established by the Sixth Committee for that purpose.

The meeting rose at 6.15 p.m.